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Abstract 
 
 This paper suggests a two-level game analysis of Israel’s strategy toward peace 
during the 1990s. The paper shows how various paradoxes in Israeli society create 
domestic obstacles and internal opposition that weaken Israel’s bargaining position 
toward neighboring countries. Treating domestic parameters in these countries as a 
given, we argue that Israeli leaders can hardly use this weakness to manipulate 
information in the bargaining process, because neighboring countries can observe 
Israel’s internal processes. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the 
impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards neighboring 
polities, especially the Palestinians, without actually creating the necessary internal 
conditions for such a policy, may finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel – 
in terms of territory and deterrent ability – since it will have to compromise under 
difficult conditions. Several practical implications as to the preferred bargaining 
process under these conditions follow. 
 
Introduction 
 
During his service as Secretary of State in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger once 
stated that Israel did not have a foreign policy, it had only domestic policy. By that he 
meant that Israel’s foreign policy is primarily the result of internal conditions and 
constraints. Yet since this claim was made, students of Israel’s foreign and strategic 
policy, especially within the discipline of international relations, have not dealt with 
this issue systematically. Most studies focus on the balance of power between Israel 
and the neighboring countries as measured by armed forces, territory and security 
budget (Karsh and Mahler, 1994). Kissinger’s observation seems more correct than 
ever in the 1990s, however, in light of events since the signing of the Oslo Agreement.  
 This observation was reaffirmed recently, in May 2000, when Israel unilaterally 
withdrew from Lebanon. The withdrawal followed strong internal pressures that were 
interpreted by many as a significant decline in the willingness of the Israeli public to 
pay the price of conflict. Indeed, Sheik Nassralla, the leader of the Southern Lebanese 
guerrilla organization Hizbullah, called on the Palestinians to observe how weak Israel 
had become despite its military strength. 
 This paper analyzes the impact of internal socio-political and economic processes 
in Israel on its strategic position in the Middle East, and especially its peace strategy 
during the 1990s. We assume that Israel is facing a bloc of hostile countries composed 
of players such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and parts of Palestinian society. The interests 
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of these players may differ in certain aspects, and they do not necessarily coordinate 
their strategy towards Israel. We assume, however, that their basic calculations 
concerning Israel are similar, and therefore concentrate on domestic variables that 
influence Israel’s strategic choices while treating domestic parameters in the hostile 
bloc as a given. 
 The paper uses the general concept of “nested games,” where players’ interests 
and actions in one game are influenced by their involvement in others (Tsebelis, 1990; 
Colomer, 1995). Specifically, the paper applies the idea of a two-level game, as 
developed for analyzing international relations and foreign policy (Schelling, 1960; 
Putnam, 1988; Iida, 1993; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993; Schneider and 
Cederman, 1994; Mo, 1995; Schultz, 1998). Two-level game literature has introduced 
solid micro foundations to the theory of international bargaining. Most importantly, this 
research tradition has shown that the amount of uncertainty in the international system 
is not a given but can be manipulated both for the better and for the worse. This 
ambiguous potential is the essence of a two-level dilemma in world politics in which 
domestic politics affects international behavior both positively and negatively, and vice 
versa – clearly, international conditions also affect domestic politics, which again 
affects foreign policy. To avoid a cyclical argument, we concentrate on explaining 
foreign policy based on internal conditions. The opposite direction of this mutual 
dependency between foreign and domestic policy will be discussed only when 
necessary.  
 A major debate in the literature is whether domestic obstacles weaken or 
strengthen the state’s bargaining position in international negotiations. Putnam (1988) 
has shown how negotiators might claim successfully that domestic opposition prevents 
them from concurring in an international agreement. Iida (1993) questions this 
argument and relies on sequential bargaining to analyze how domestic constraints 
impact the negotiations between two states, given various assumptions regarding 
information. One basic result is that a country’s bargaining leverage does not 
necessarily increase when its domestic constraints become more severe. When there is 
complete information about domestic constraints, the constrained negotiator has a 
bargaining advantage only if the constraints are severe. When there is asymmetric 
international information, the constrained negotiator will benefit only if the foreign 
negotiator strongly believes that the home negotiator is severely constrained. Finally, 
Iida (1993) shows that when there is incomplete domestic information (on the side of 
the home negotiator), the constrained negotiator has a bargaining advantage if the 
probability of successful ratification increases with the share that this side receives. 
This opens up the possibility for misinterpretation, which may lead to efficiency loss. 
On the other hand, Schultz (1998) shows that as there is more domestic competition in 
a state (e.g., in democratic regimes), the ex ante probability of war decreases, since a 
strategic opposition party helps reveal information about the state’s preferences. In this 
paper, we argue that the Schultz model is more accurate than the Iida model for 
analyzing the interaction between Israel and the neighboring countries. Given Israel’s 
democratic regime, neighboring countries can easily obtain information about Israel’s 
internal processes. 
 Empirical studies also question Putnam’s argument. According to Evans et al 
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(1993: 409), leaders “did try to strategically misinterpret their own politics, but not as 
often as expected, and with much less success.” In Moravscik’s view (1993: 159), 
bluffing is rare because governments might be able to predict the actions of an eventual 
cheater: “…among modern information-rich democracies, it is extremely difficult for 
negotiators to mask their true domestic win-set, even in a sensitive area of national 
security like weapons procurement.” In other words, as the clarity of a state’s domestic 
obstacles increases, the ability of the state’s leaders to manipulate this information in 
the bargaining process declines. Such clarity is more likely in democracies, but in many 
cases it also exists in non-democratic systems.  
 With regard to Israel’s strategic choices and foreign policy in the Middle East 
during the 1990s, this paper shows how domestic obstacles and internal opposition 
weaken Israel’s bargaining position towards the hostile bloc it faces. We also argue that 
using this weakness to manipulate information is unlikely to be advantageous, because 
of the characteristics of two-level interaction, as mentioned above. 
 During the 1990s Israel faced several challenges – especially the Gulf War in 
1991 and the armament of states like Syria and Iran – which threatened to upset the 
balance of power between it and several neighboring countries that comprise a hostile 
bloc. Those events, as well as the Palestinian uprising (“Intifada”) since 1987, led 
Israeli leaders to devise a peace policy that found expression in the Oslo Agreement 
signed in September 1993 (Peres and Naor, 1993). However, due to internal opposition 
within both Israeli and Palestinian societies, the peace process, which brought great 
hope to the region, gradually slowed down. Moslem and Jewish fundamentalists 
committed terrorist attacks on civilian populations. The Israeli Prime Minister who 
made peace, Yitzhak Rabin, was murdered at a political rally by a Jewish extremist, 
and Palestinian suicide bombers took the lives of many Israelis. Thus, the public mood 
was more open to the right-wing campaign that brought Benjamin Netanyahu to power 
in 1996. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “The air of 
optimism generated by the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake on the lawn of the White 
House in September 1993, dissipated long ago… official Israeli statements refer to the 
process as going through a critical stage. The Secretary-General of the Palestinian 
Cabinet, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, has gone much further. In March 1998, he announced 
the death of the peace process.” (IISS, 1998: 144).  
 The shift in Israel’s approach to the peace process cannot be attributed solely to 
the fact that a right-wing government governed Israel from May 1996 to May 1999. We 
argue, rather, that it is not only ideological considerations that explain the slow-down 
of the peace process but also several paradoxes within Israeli society. Since the 
Palestinians, as well as other Arab countries, observe these processes, Israeli leaders 
are hardly able to use domestic obstacles to manipulate information in the bargaining 
process, as might be theorized according to Schelling (1960: 22) and Putnam (1988). 
Therefore, a precondition for an Israeli leader to halt the peace process for any reason 
and take a conflictual approach toward the hostile bloc is to shape the preferences of 
Israeli society. This includes convincing the different population segments that Israel is 
playing a non-cooperative game with its neighbors – especially the Palestinians – and 
creating a willingness to tolerate the high cost of violent conflict. We show, however, 
that the deepening polarization of Israeli society in various dimensions makes it very 
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hard to create such beliefs. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the 
impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards the hostile 
bloc, without actually creating the necessary internal conditions for such policy, may 
finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel – in terms of territory and deterrence 
ability – since it will have to compromise under difficult conditions. Once Israeli 
leaders understand these limitations, it is highly probable that they will form a peace 
strategy that takes into account the different interests and sensitivities of the 
neighboring states. Further, the analysis suggests that a consensus in Israeli society may 
be achieved if there is a sequential bargaining process on crucial issues, with decisions 
on each issue being taken one at a time, followed by implementation and evaluation of 
outcomes.  
 The paper is organized as follows. The following section uses games in presenting 
the development of power relations and equilibria in the Middle East until the 1990s. 
The next section discusses domestic conditions that influence Israel’s strategic choices, 
as well as its peace policy. Subsequently, we model and explain the possible impact of 
those domestic conditions on Israel’s strategy toward the peace process with the 
Palestinians.  
 
The Development of Power Relations in the Middle East 
 
 The main characteristic of the relations between Israel and neighboring countries 
has been that these countries did not recognize Israel’s right to exist as an independent 
state. Until 1977 this was the position of all Arab countries; since then several states – 
Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and some Persian Gulf states – have joined the peace 
process to some extent. Hostile countries, however, such as Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq, 
still do not recognize Israel’s right to exist. As for the Israeli side, it has recognized all 
Arab states, other than the Palestinians’ right to an independent state. Moreover, until 
1967 the conflict was not about “the occupied territories” but concerned, rather, most 
of the area of Israel as one large occupied territory. The minimal demand was for Israel 
to give up territories it occupied in the 1948 Independence War and to allow the return 
of Palestinian refugees. The maximal demand, of course, was the abolition of Israel as 
an independent state. As a result, the Israeli national security conception has been 
defensive at the strategic level and offensive at the operative level (Horowitz, 1975). 
The defensive approach at the strategic level has relied on conventional and non-
conventional deterrence, motivating a reciprocal arms race between Israel and its 
neighbors (Aronson, 1984).  
 Given the existential nature of the conflict until the early 1970s, the power 
relations between the Arab countries and Israel during that period can be best described 
as a zero-sum game. First, we will illustrate this argument by specifying the 
preferences of Israel and its neighbors, excluding the Palestinians, until the mid-1970s. 
Then we will explain how, since the mid-1970s, the game between Israel and some 
neighboring countries has been transformed into a symmetrical prisoners’ dilemma (see 
also: Brams, 1994: 85-7, 101-2). Finally, we suggest a game for analyzing the power 
relations between Israel and the Palestinians.  
 In the first stage, the players – Israel (I) and a given neighboring country (N) – are 
Shlomo Mizrahi, Abraham Mehrez, Arye Naor 47
 
 
modeled as unitary players, i.e., they are assumed to be homogeneous societies. In this 
game each side has two strategies. Israel can cooperate (C) with the neighboring 
country by signing a peace treaty which satisfies the neighboring country's territorial 
(or other) demands to some extent, or not cooperate (D), meaning that it does not give 
up any territory but has to invest in building deterrent ability. The neighboring country 
can cooperate (C) with Israel by recognizing its legitimacy to exist and signing a peace 
treaty, or not cooperate (D), meaning that it does not recognize Israel and has to invest 
in the arms race. The combination of these strategies creates four possible outcomes: 
 
 C-C: Both sides cooperate. 
 D-C: Israel does not cooperate while the neighboring country cooperates. 
 C-D: Israel cooperates while the neighboring country does not cooperate. 
 D-D: Neither side cooperates. 
 
 The players’ preferences for these outcomes are as follows: Israel mostly prefers 
D-C, because then it benefits from the neighboring country’s cooperation without 
giving up any territory (α). Israel’s least preferred outcome is C-D, because then it 
gives up territory without benefiting (δ). It pays a price both in terms of territory and by 
further investment in building deterrent ability. Israel prefers mutual cooperation (β), 
C-C, to mutual defection (γ), D-D, because then it can attain peace for its citizens and 
reduce the cost of an arms buildup. The underlying assumption is that Israel recognizes 
the benefits of peace even at the cost of territorial compromise. As will be shown later, 
if this is not the case for both sides, the conflict is even deeper than that described by a 
zero-sum game or by the prisoners’ dilemma. Israel’s order of preferences is: 
   α = (D,C) > β= (C,C) > γ= (D,D) > δ = (C,D) 
 
 The neighboring country has calculations similar to those of Israel for D-C and C-
D. Yet, as explained, until the mid-1970s the neighboring countries did not recognize 
Israel’s legitimacy to exist and therefore preferred mutual defection to mutual 
cooperation. That is, the neighboring country in this game did not believe it could attain 
any benefits from mutual cooperation while it could benefit from escalating the 
conflict. It follows that the neighboring country prefers D-D to C-C; thus, its order of 
preference is: 
α = (C,D) > β= (D,D) > γ = (C,C) > δ= (D,C) 
 
Figure 1: A Zero-Sum Game between Israel and a Hostile Neighboring Country 
 
                   Hostile Bloc  
                    C                D 
             C        β, γ              δ, α  
              Israel 
             D        α, δ             γ, β  
The players’ order of preference is presented in a game matrix in Figure 1 where 
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α>β>γ>δ. This is a zero-sum game where one player’s win is the other’s loss. 
Technically, if the order is presented in terms of numbers, e.g., 1,2,3,4, the sum in each 
cell is the same. In this game, both players have a dominant strategy of non-cooperation 
(D) leading to the unique Nash equilibrium (γ, β). This means that in a situation of 
conflict the neighboring country is better off than Israel since it does not recognize any 
benefits from cooperation.  
 It follows that any change in the equilibrium outcome, which existed until the 
mid-1970s, required a preference change by the neighboring country. The change came 
about due to certain changes in attitude after the Yom Kippur war of October 1973 
(Stein, 1985). This and other processes we will not discuss here changed the attitudes 
of some neighboring countries about cooperation (Mansur, 1985). They began 
recognizing the advantages of mutual cooperation, meaning that the zero-sum game 
presented in Figure 1 was transformed into the symmetrical prisoners’ dilemma 
presented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: A Symmetric Prisoners’ Dilemma between Israel and a Neighboring Country 
 
      Neighboring Country 
                  C               D 
             C        β, β            δ, α  
            Israel 
             D        α, δ            γ, γ   
 
 
In this game, neither Israel nor the neighboring country is motivated to begin 
cooperating on its own. Therefore, both sides stay with their dominant strategy of non-
cooperation and the equilibrium remains very stable. It is commonly argued that the 
players can reach a Pareto-optimal outcome (β, β) when a third party intervenes and 
creates incentives for (or forces) cooperation.  
 Third party intervention is usually discussed in the literature with respect to 
intrastate, often ethnic, conflicts (Licklider, 1993; Gurr, 1993; Gottlieb, 1993). Walter 
(1997), for example, studied 41 civil wars between 1940 and 1990, and showed the 
importance of third-party intervention in finding successful negotiated solutions. She 
argues that negotiated settlements do not fail because bargains cannot be struck but, 
rather, because it is almost impossible for the combatants themselves to arrange 
credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement. Regan (1996) also studied all 
intrastate conflicts since 1944, showing that it is the characteristics of the intervention 
strategy rather than the characteristics of the conflict that largely determine the success 
of the intervention. Thus, third-party intervention is required both to create incentives 
for cooperation and to guarantee the terms of compromise.  
 Indeed, under the new circumstances created by the 1973 war, the intervention of 
a third party became possible and American mediation led to the first peace treaty in 
the Middle East – between Israel and Egypt. In that peace process both incentives and 
guarantees were needed. 
 To complete the analysis of the historical conditions, we now suggest a game to 
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describe the power relations between Israel and the Palestinians until the early 1990s. 
As explained, in that period neither Israel nor the Palestinians recognized the other’s 
right to form an independent state. Therefore, the essence of the conflict was 
existential, meaning that neither side recognized the advantages of mutual cooperation. 
The order of preferences that corresponds to this situation is that of the neighboring 
country in Figure 1. If neither side recognizes the advantages of mutual cooperation, 
the D-D outcome is preferred to the C-C one.  
 
Figure 3: The Power Relations between Israel and the Palestinians when Both Sides 
                Do Not Recognize the Advantages of Mutual Cooperation  
 
                   Palestinians  
                        C                  D 
              C       γ, γ               δ, α  
                           Israel 
             D      α, δ              β, β  
 
 
Figure 3 shows that, under the above-mentioned condition, not only is there a 
dominant strategy of non-cooperation for both sides but also the Nash equilibrium is 
Pareto-optimal (β, β). In other words, both sides believe they win something in a D-D 
situation while they would only lose in a C-C situation. This means that even if there is 
a third party who wants to force an agreement, it will have to invest a lot of resources, 
because the cost of mutual cooperation is higher than the cost of mutual non-
cooperation. In comparison, in the prisoners’ dilemma the choice of D-D is due to Nash 
equilibrium calculations leading to a situation of mutually hurting stalemate situation 
(Zartman, 1991). In such a case, a third party’s intervention can evidently help the sides 
achieve cooperation.  
 This equilibrium analysis does not refer to domestic variables because until the 
mid-1970s Israeli society and political culture were uni-dimensional on the security 
issue  (Arian, 1985; Barzilai, 1996; Sened, 1996). Internal conflicts were covered by 
the belief that it was necessary to defend the country, as long as the Labor party 
governed Israel, from 1948 to 1977. This homogeneous political culture began to 
change in 1977 when the Likud party formed a coalition for the first time. This 
electoral change expressed and triggered the polarization of Israeli society in several 
aspects. As a result, Israel’s strategic choices and calculations in its relations with 
neighboring countries have been transformed.  
 
Internal Processes Influencing Israel’s Strategy toward Peace in the Late 1990s 
 
The socio-political and economic processes during 1977-1998 highlight five 
dimensions that influence Israel’s power and strategic choices in the international 
scene: The socio-economic dimension, the ethnic-religious dimension, the geographical 
dimension in terms of center-periphery relations, the security dimension in light of the 
Arab-Israel conflict, and the dimension of arms buildup, both conventional and non-
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conventional. In this section, we describe the polarization in each dimension and the 
mutual dependence between them. According to opinion polls, 30% of the Jewish-
Israeli population regard the increased internal tension among various segments of the 
people as the most important problem on Israel’s public agenda, and 31% so regard the 
slowdown in the economy, while only 19% regard the stalemate in the peace process as 
the most important problem facing Israel (Ya’ar and Hermann, 1998). Since the 
polarization in the various dimensions merge with each other, any Israeli government 
potentially faces significant domestic difficulties in building a consensus around a 
foreign policy.  
 The Socio-Economic Dimension: Traditionally the Israeli economy has been 
characterized as highly centralized due to the socialist political culture (Horowitz and 
Lissak, 1989). The 1990s, however, have been characterized by privatization processes, 
with various social and economic consequences. These processes include market 
liberalization, deregulation, transfer of control and management to stockholders, and 
attempts by international companies to enter the Israeli market (Office for Economic 
Planning’s Report, 1994). Another aspect of these processes is the creation of 
flexibility and mobilization in the labor force, thus intensifying socio-economic 
inequality. Further, due to security problems during the Palestinian uprising 
(“Intifada”), the Israeli economy became dependent on cheap imported labor to replace 
cheap Palestinian workers. The large number of imported workers from Africa, South-
East Asia and Eastern Europe created significant social, demographic and moral 
problems due to their very low wages, inequality and lack of basic social and labor 
rights (Kondor, 1997). This labor policy, which was encouraged by the government, 
also created significant difficulties for the Palestinian economy, which was highly 
dependent on the Israeli economy (Roy, 1995).  
 The growing socio-economic gaps together with rising unemployment became one 
of the main issues dividing Israeli society, creating a potential for conflict. Further, 
when the polarization of this dimension merges with polarization in other dimensions, 
the potential for conflict intensifies. This leads us to the second dimension listed above. 
 The Ethnic-Religious Dimension:  Israeli society is made up of Jewish immigrants 
from many countries. From the 1920s to the 1940s, these immigrants came mainly 
from Europe, thus creating a predominantly Western-oriented culture (Horowitz and 
Lissak, 1989). During the 1950s, after the establishment of the State of Israel, there was 
large-scale immigration from Arab and Muslim states, thus changing the proportion 
between the Western-oriented population segment, usually termed “Ashkenazi” and the 
Eastern-oriented population segment, usually termed “Sephardi.” The arrival of  
Sephardim in a predominantly Western-oriented culture created many difficulties for 
them in becoming established (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989:117). Over the long term, 
this ethnic division merged with the socio-economic polarization:  The lower classes 
were mostly composed of Sephardim, and this intensified their feelings of 
discrimination and deprivation.  
 Furthermore, many Sephardim were religiously observant, and thus the orthodox-
secular polarization in Israeli society also merged with the previous two (Liebman, 
1997; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). On the other hand, national-religious Ashkenazim 
also share the popular feeling of traditional Sephardim against the individualism that 
Shlomo Mizrahi, Abraham Mehrez, Arye Naor 51
 
 
characterizes the willingness to negotiate with the Palestinians and to recognize the 
PLO. In the previous decade, Israel (together with Portugal) had been excluded from 
Western individualism, on the grounds of its collectivist culture (Hofstede, 1983; 
Huntington, 1996: 71). As Liebman (1997: 102-103) notes, in the current era of 
growing individualist ethos, religious Zionists are the sector most committed to the 
values of Israel’s civil religion. The religious import of their political and cultural 
approach gives it a sense of holiness that separates religiously orthodox people from 
the rest of society. The merging of polarization in the two dimensions discussed so far 
(i.e., the socio-economic and the ethnic-religious dimensions) intensifies the conflicts 
between these population segments. It also presents great difficulty in terms of 
mobilizing the entire society for a given cause, because the bonds that maintained a 
certain national consensus until 1977 no longer exist. The polarization in other 
dimensions further intensifies the problem. 
 The Geographical Dimension of Center-Periphery Relations: Interestingly 
enough, polarization in the geographical dimension also fits the other aspects discussed 
thus far. Many new immigrants to Israel during the 1950s were sent to the periphery, 
especially to development towns in the south and north of Israel, while the political, 
economic and geographical centers (i.e., Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem) were dominated by 
the upper and middle classes (Arian, 1985; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Lipshitz, 1996; 
Waterman, 1996). As a result, the periphery is dominated by traditional and religious, 
lower-class Sephardim. It follows that the geographical division of Israeli society also 
fits the other aspects of polarization and inferiority, as well as their political 
consequences.  
 The Security Dimension relative to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: This dimension has 
been dominant in Israeli society for most of the century (Arian, 1985; Arian and 
Shamir, 1990; Barzilai, 1996; Sened, 1996). The question of territorial compromise in 
exchange for peace has been at the center of political debate since the beginning of 
Zionism. Other questions, such as Israeli-Jewish identity, usually merged into this 
dimension. In this respect, until 1977 there was a national consensus on the policy 
adopted by the Labor-led government (Arian and Shamir, 1990). However, the socio-
political and economic processes discussed so far also influenced this dimension. Since 
the early 1980s – especially since the 1982 Israeli-Palestinian war in Lebanon – the 
polarization between right and left in Israeli society intensified (Arian and Shamir, 
1990; 1994; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989).  
 To a large extent this polarization fits the divisions in the other dimensions – 
lower-class voters, the Sephardim, voters in the periphery, and religious voters 
traditionally support right-wing parties (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 1998; Shamir 
and Arian, 1999). Shamir and Arian (1999) present a logistic regression based on a 
longitudinal analysis of electoral cleavages from 1969 to 1996, and an analysis of the 
1996 election. They show that religious, Sephardim, less educated, and lower status 
workers voted for the right-wing Likud and religious parties, whereas the left (Labor 
and Meretz) has had a disproportionate share of secular, upper class Ashkenazi voters. 
Since voting patterns significantly correlate with the preferences concerning the peace 
process, this cross-sectional characterization fits the polarization in the security 
dimension. This argument is also supported by an ongoing monthly opinion poll done 
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by Yaar and Hermann (1993-2000), beginning in August 1993. These polls, also called 
the peace index, basically examine the public’s attitudes toward the peace process 
given ongoing events and the divisions in Israeli society. As explained earlier, the 
range of alternatives in Israel’s policy toward neighboring countries is ultimately 
reduced to a dichotomous choice: A person is either for or against giving up territory in 
exchange for peace. This distinction is the basis for the poll questions. The participants 
sampled are representative of the Jewish population of Israel. According to this 
continuing opinion poll, the religious population in general, and the Ultra-Orthodox in 
particular, has assumed the role of the radical right-wing symbol for everything 
touching on the peace process (Ya’ar and Hermann, 1997a). Among the Ultra-
Orthodox only 20.5% support or greatly support the process; among those defining 
themselves as Religious 43% support the process. On the other hand, 82% of 
traditionalist and 78% of secular groups declared their support for the process (Ya’ar 
and Hermann, 1997b).  
 Thus, low-class voters, Sephardim, peripheral voters and religious voters 
traditionally support right-wing parties. Although some of these voters do not 
completely accept the right-wing attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict, they vote for 
right-wing parties based on their calculations and preferences in the other dimensions 
(Arian and Shamir, 1990; 1994). As a result, Israeli society faces the paradox that a 
small majority of the population favors the peace process, but this is not clearly 
expressed in the political division of power.  
Table 1 shows there is long-standing support for the peace process, but 
Netanyahu still won the May 1996 election even though he challenged the peace policy 
of his predecessors, Rabin and Peres. It was only in the May 1999 election that the left-
wing candidate, Barak, took over from Netanyahu, and that supporters of the peace 
process received nearly 50% of the seats in the parliament. Thus, since May 1999 the 
near-50% support for the peace process has been expressed in the political division of 
power. 
Table 1 also shows certain changes in the support for the peace process over the 
months. Although these changes are not statistically significant, they are usually 
attributed to events and developments in the peace process. For example, violent 
attacks by the Palestinians in the territories or by Hizbullah in Lebanon are clearly 
followed by declining support for the peace process. Thus, the two-level dynamic also 
works in the opposite direction. Not only do internal processes influence foreign policy 
but international events and developments also influence internal beliefs and processes. 
It is often argued, for example, that the slowdown in the peace process during 1994-95 
can be attributed to the murderous car bombs exploded by extreme Palestinians, which 
killed many Israelis.  
 It follows that the deep polarization in the socio-economic, ethnic-religious and 
geographical dimensions project strongly onto the security dimension, thus creating 
great domestic difficulty for any peace policy. Furthermore, the deep polarization 
between different social segments creates domestic difficulties for any foreign policy, 
because Israel’s leaders cannot create a consensus for a militarist policy either. As 
expressed through their behavior during the Gulf War and the long-standing conflict in 
Lebanon and the occupied territories, many of Israel’s citizens are no longer willing to 
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pay the high price of a non-consensual war (Barzilai, 1996; Ya’ar and Hermann, 1998). 
This approach also affects the fifth dimension mentioned above – arms buildup, both 
conventional and non-conventional. 
 
Table 1: The Level of Support in the Peace Process with the Palestinians among 
  the  Jewish-Israeli Population – August 1993-April 2000 
 
       Time In favor 
(percent) 
      Time  In favor  
    
(percent) 
August 1993       53 June 1997       50.2     
June 1994       51 September 1997       45.9 
December 1994       47.4 December 1997       49.4 
March 1995       48.5 March 1998       50.9 
September 1995       45.3 September 1998       47.2 
December 1995       55.8 December 1998       52.2 
March 1996       50.5 April 1999       56.8 
June 1996       48.4 August 1999       47.8 
September 1996       50 November 1999       51.7 
December 1996       54.5 April 2000       47.9 
March 1997       48 August 2000       45.3 
 Source: Yaar and Hermann (1993-2000) 
 
 The Dimension of Non-conventional Deterrence: For many years Israel 
maintained a policy of obscuring its nuclear capability, by stating it would not be the 
first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East (Aronson, 1992). 
Nevertheless, it became common belief that Israel had an impressive nuclear 
endowment. Based on his impressions from Egyptian leaders, Peres attributed Egypt’s 
decision to make peace with Israel to that capability, in part (Peres and Naor, 1993: 4-
5). It did not, however, prevent Egypt from launching a limited war against Israel four 
years earlier. According to some accounts, in 1973 Israel already had nuclear arms, 
which could be deployed from aircraft and missiles (Hersh, 1991: 215-6; Paul, 1995). 
Israeli deterrent calculations were based on the possession of superior conventional and 
nuclear capability, and the Israeli leadership implicitly declared this capability to be its 
ultimate deterrent against an Arab attack:  Before the October 1973 war, leaders such 
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as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan hinted at the Israeli nuclear deterrent and made 
ambiguous nuclear threats (Evron, 1990; Bar-Joseph, 1982; Feldman, 1982; Freedman, 
1975). Dayan reportedly believed that the Arab states would not initiate a war before 
the early 1980s, and until then Israel’s nuclear capability likely would act as a deterrent 
against conventional attack. From 1967 to 1973, the Arab leaders and the media talked 
unceasingly of Israeli nuclear capability and the implications of it (Van Creveld, 1993: 
108-110; Evron, 1973: 19-31). The Egyptians were also presumed to have received 
intelligence information on Israel’s nuclear weapons and strategy from Soviet spies 
who had penetrated the state’s defense and intelligence establishments (Hersh, 1991: 
219). 
 However, non-conventional deterrence capability did not deter Egypt and Syria 
from starting a conventional war in October 1973. Stein (1985) suggests that Egyptian 
internal politics were much more important than Israel’s conventional or non-
conventional strength. Paul (1995), on the other hand, attributes this and other similar 
cases to the concept of “nuclear taboo,” the notion that nuclear weapons are 
characterized by their non-use. As Schelling (1994: 110) argues, the main reason for 
the uniqueness of nuclear weapons is the perception that they are unique and that once 
introduced into combat, they cannot be “contained, restrained, confined, or limited.” 
Given this “nuclear taboo,” Israel’s nuclear ability cannot guarantee that a limited war 
will not break out. Therefore, the influence of Israeli society’s deep polarizations on its 
willingness to enter into a conventional war is a central parameter in analyzing the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.    
 These polarizations, which cannot be hidden from neighboring countries, is a 
source of weakness for Israel’s position in the region. Israel’s leaders can indeed claim, 
as they often have, that they cannot proceed with the peace process due to internal 
opposition. But neighboring countries can also observe the strong opposition to a non-
consensual war. Domestic obstacles, therefore, can hardly be used to manipulate 
information in the bargaining process. We now discuss the effect of these obstacles on 
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. 
 
Israel’s Strategic Choices Relative to the Peace Process with 
the Palestinians in the Late 1990s 
 
 In this section, we analyze Israel’s strategic choices with regard to the peace 
process with the Palestinians in the late 1990s. Given the two-level game approach, we 
first explain the preferences of the two sides as they have been shaped until the late 
1990s. Based on these preferences, we outline the basic strategic choices open to Israeli 
leaders. We then expand the analysis to explain the bargaining mechanism preferred for 
Israel. 
 Applying the two-level game to the Palestinians, their position was influenced by 
international events such as the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
loss of superpower support by Syria and other Arab states, as well as the Palestinians’ 
own loss of support from the Gulf States following the 1991 war with Iraq. These 
events created the basic conditions for the Palestinians to move toward a cooperative 
strategy as expressed by the signing of the Oslo Agreement (Zartman, 1997). 
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 Yet, since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, dissatisfaction with the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process has grown significantly among the Palestinian population 
(IISS, 1998: 146-148). As expressed in the Palestinians’ own observations, the 
economic situation in their autonomous regions deteriorated (Roy, 1995) and the Israeli 
government’s new policy since May 1996 has left the impression that their demands 
will not be met soon enough. As one military officer said, “When people are hungry, 
policy disintegrates” (Limor, 1998). As a result, they hardly trust Israel’s promises and 
commitments. This change in attitude, which mainly took place during 1996-1998, 
means that the Palestinians’ order of preference in the prisoners’ dilemma is as 
presented in Figure 2. They recognize the advantages of cooperation but believe they 
are playing a non-cooperative game with Israel, meaning that they prefer conflict (D-D) 
to the option of being the sole compromiser (D-C).     
 Because of the internal polarization discussed earlier, however, Israel has a 
different order of preference in its game with the Palestinians. This polarization means 
that Israeli society is divided in respect to the peace process. A significant right-wing 
segment of society actually views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of the 
prisoners’ dilemma described in Figure 2. Among them is a small “farther right” group 
of Israelis who, in line with the Figure 3 game, genuinely prefer mutual conflict with 
the Arabs to mutual cooperation. On the other hand, supporters of the peace process are 
more inclined toward cooperation with the Palestinians and clearly are not willing to 
pay the price of what they regard “a non-consensual war”. This means that their order 
of preference is similar to that in the Chicken game, where conflict is the worst 
outcome (Taylor, 1987). In a symmetrical Chicken game, there are two equilibria in 
pure strategies:  A player will cooperate if he/she believes the other will not cooperate, 
but will not cooperate if he/she believes the other will. 
 It follows that, given domestic conditions, Israeli leaders can adopt neither a 
conflictual approach toward the Palestinians nor a coherent peace strategy. All they can 
know with certainty is that a majority of the population supports some version of 
compromise, and that to those in favor of the peace process a violent conflict with the 
Palestinians constitutes the highest cost and therefore may also deepen the polarization, 
towards a total disintegration of Israeli society. On the other hand, right-wing parties 
and their supporters are split. Since most of them understand that the Oslo Agreement 
is irreversible (Sprinzak, 1998), they are willing to make some compromises, meaning 
that mutual cooperation is preferred to mutual defection. Thus, for them as well a 
violent conflict is ordered low in their preferences, while a reasonable compromise in 
their view can be accepted. This approach is expressed, for example, in the relatively 
low mass mobilization against compromises made by Netanyahu and Barak. In 
addition, in the May 1999 elections right-wing parties which strongly opposed any 
compromise in the peace process lost many seats in the parliament, and they now 
constitute only 7-10% of the seats. Overall, the hard core of strong opposition to the 
peace process is composed of religious settlers numbering about 50 thousand people. 
Although they constitute a strong interest group, they have gradually understood their 
power is limited. Furthermore, following the assassination of Itzhak Rabin in 1995 their 
modes of protest have modified significantly, and the intensity of their protest activities 
has declined  (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 1998a). This opposition may also use 
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party tactical/electoral/coalition calculations to bring about the government’s 
disintegration following a given move in the peace process. But these are stages in the 
adaptation of public attitudes to peace and of the division of political power in the 
parliament. Based on these indications, we argue that a clear majority of Israeli public 
and politicians recognize the need for compromises in negotiating with the Palestinians. 
This means that the long-term potential for societal disintegration as a result of 
concessions is lower than the disintegration potential as a result of conflict.  
 Thus, it is almost impossible to create a consensus for a conflictual strategy 
toward the Palestinians, while a reasonable consensus can be achieved over certain 
concessions. Therefore, the option of violent conflict is the worst possible outcome for 
Israeli leaders in their relations with the Palestinians. As explained in the previous 
section, the polarization in all dimensions converges; as a result politicians and 
observers have difficulty isolating the attitudes and motivations in each dimension 
separately. Yet, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders clearly observe the unwillingness of 
the Israeli public to pay the high price of violent conflict. They can both interpret the 
preference ordering of Israeli leaders as being similar to that of the Chicken game. 
Hence, due to domestic obstacles, Israeli leaders’ order of preference in their game 
with the Palestinians can be represented as follows: 
α = (D,C) > β = (C,C) > γ = (C,D) > δ = (D,D) 
The combination of the players’ order of preference leads to an asymmetric game as 
presented in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Asymmetric Power Relations between Israel and the Palestinians 
                  Palestinians 
                 C                D 
            C       β, β            γ, α  
                Israeli 
    Leaders D       α, δ            δ, γ  
 
 In this game, the Palestinians have a dominant strategy of non-cooperation. Israeli 
leaders, on the other hand, have an order of preference in the Chicken game, meaning 
they will cooperate if the Palestinians do not cooperate but will not cooperate if the 
Palestinians do. If Israeli leaders recognize the Palestinians’ order of preference, they 
can expect them to choose non-cooperation. Then the best possible strategy for Israeli 
leaders is cooperation, leading to a unique Nash equilibrium with pure strategies (γ,α).  
 This equilibrium outcome expresses the asymmetry between Israeli and 
Palestinian societies in terms of their willingness to tolerate the costs of a violent 
conflict. Since Israeli society is less willing than Palestinian society to bear such costs, 
it can be expected to achieve sub-optimal results as long as the non-cooperative game 
continues and the Palestinians are willing to enter into a violent conflict. Furthermore, 
this analysis implies that possible attempts by Israeli leaders to express an order of 
preference in the prisoners’ dilemma rather than recognizing the weaknesses of Israeli 
society may indeed lead to violent conflict, in which Israel will have no choice but to 
compromise under difficult conditions. Given the asymmetric game presented in Figure 
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4, the straightforward option for Israeli leaders is to influence the Palestinians’ order of 
preference in such a way that violent conflict will become the worst outcome for them 
as well. This means increasing the potential losses from a violent conflict by increasing 
its costs, as well as increasing the benefits from cooperation – i.e., accelerating the 
peace process rather than slowing it down. Alternatively, Israeli leaders may try to 
create a broad consensus in Israeli society with respect to the preferred strategy, 
whether a peaceful or conflictual one, toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 Moreover, since the Palestinian and Israeli communities are highly integrated, 
Israeli leaders can hardly use domestic obstacles to manipulate information in the 
bargaining process. They can claim, as they often have, that due to these obstacles they 
cannot proceed with the peace process, but the Palestinians can also see their 
difficulties in creating a consensus for a militarist policy. Therefore any attempt to 
manipulate information and create the impression that Israel has an order of preference 
in the prisoners’ dilemma is not likely to succeed. Rather, it may trap Israeli leaders in 
their own manipulation, thus creating a cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, 
Palestinian negotiators successfully use internal opposition to argue that they cannot 
make significant concessions. Yet if, as a result, Palestinian-Israeli relations deteriorate 
to a violent conflict, Israeli leaders will have to compromise under difficult conditions 
as expected by the asymmetric game presented in Figure 4. 
 A more complex analysis of the game in Figure 4, however, enables us to draw 
practical conclusions about the preferred bargaining mechanism for Israel, as well as 
possible ways to influence the attitudes of the Israeli public through this mechanism. 
 The game in Figure 4 describes the core of the strategic dilemma that Israel is 
facing. Although the bargaining in the peace process is very complex, with many 
decision points on specific issues and many issues on the table, ultimately it can be 
reduced to several final decisions that will have to be made on key issues:  The size and 
location of territories to be under Palestinian rule, the Jerusalem problem, the refugees 
problem, division of water resources, border controls, and military limitations on the 
Palestinian state. We argue that given the conditions existing in the late 1990s, at each 
of these crucial decision points Israel is likely to face the strategic dilemma described 
in Figure 4. In other words, no matter how long the bargaining continues and whatever 
tactical moves the sides make, at the final point of decision the Palestinians are likely to 
adopt a conflictual approach in order to force Israel to make concessions. As long as 
this game continues, Israel is likely to make these concessions. 
 Furthermore, given the Israel public’s unwillingness to pay the price of conflict, 
dividing the peace process into many points of decision on small matters, such as the 
release of three or a dozen Palestinian prisoners, creates a situation in which the public 
sees a violent conflict over such points as unnecessary and therefore non-consensual 
conflict. Israeli leaders therefore make the concessions. Thus, by creating many 
decision points over small points, Israeli leaders actually create a situation where the 
asymmetric game presented in Figure 4 is played again and again but its outcome does 
not lead the Israeli public to change preferences. The concessions at each point seem 
too minor to justify a conflict and thus even when the game is repeated many times, the 
outcomes at one stage do not change the conditions for the next round. This cumulative 
effect led Israeli Prime Minister Barak, for example, to move from a willingness to give 
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the Palestinians 40% of the West Bank to a willingness to give 80-90%. This means 
that breaking the peace process issues into many decision points, both in terms of sub-
issues and in terms of time, creates a situation in which there is no difference between 
the meta-game and the one-stage game. Thus, Figure 4 can describe them both. 
 It directly follows that Israel has strong interest in immediately reaching the final 
decision points over the crucial issues in a sequential bargaining process. That is, the 
best strategy for Israeli leaders is to push for a time-constrained bargaining process 
seeking agreement on each crucial point individually rather than looking for a package 
deal covering all the issues. Then, if concessions on an isolated crucial point are 
followed by a conflictual approach by the Palestinians, the Israeli public can be 
expected to see a possible conflict over the next crucial issue as a consensual one. The 
model thus concludes that the bargaining mechanism should be composed of time 
constrained discussions on a key issue, implementation of the agreement on it, 
evaluation of the outcomes by both sides, followed then by another time constrained 
discussion on a key issue, implementation, evaluation, and so on. In this way, both the 
Palestinians and Israelis will have indications about the other’s intentions on the basis 
of specific actions, rather than subjective interpretations and beliefs.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have shown the impact of domestic processes on Israel’s 
strategy toward peace during the 1990s. Such processes intensify the polarization 
between different segments in Israeli society and limit the possibility that its leaders 
can create a consensus for any policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict – especially a 
consensus for violent conflict with the Palestinians. Since the Palestinians, as well as 
other Arab countries, observe these processes, Israeli leaders can hardly use domestic 
obstacles to manipulate information in the bargaining process. 
 Although the empirical setting analyzed in this paper is very complex, we believe 
that a theoretical game approach can help make the players’ choices very clear. 
Furthermore, by using games we are bounded by certain assumptions and terminology 
that make the analysis clear and well founded. For example, changes in bargaining 
position can be attributed to many factors. By specifying the players, their choices and 
the mutual dependence between them using simple, precise language, we can point out 
explanatory variables. In this respect, the two-level game analysis clearly helps explain 
the complex world of international relations. We believe it is very hard to generalize 
through formal models any hypothesis regarding the impact of a two-level interaction. 
Rather, we demonstrated how internal polarization may create an order of preferences 
in the Chicken game. Further research should proceed through a comparison of detailed 
case studies.       
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